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17. November 2011, 00.01 Uhr:

Mal was aus Kuwait

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Kuwait. Da war’s bislang ziemlich ruhig. Und jetzt diese Meldung:

Thousands of Kuwaitis stormed parliament on Wednesday after police and elite forces beat up protesters marching on the prime minister’s home to demand he resign, an opposition MP said.

“Now, we have entered the house of the people,” said Mussallam al-Barrak, who led the protest along with several other lawmakers and youth activists also calling for the dissolution of parliament over alleged corruption.

The demonstrators broke open parliament’s gates and entered the main chamber, where they sang the national anthem and then left after a few minutes.

16. November 2011, 11.21 Uhr:

Bürgerlich liberales Kaliphat?

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Die angeblich ja so moderate Ennadha Partei, der man jetzt schon, um einen Autor der Jungle World zu zitieren, glauben könne, dass “sie sich in ein bürgerlich-liberales System einfügen und grundlegende Freiheiten garantieren möchte” hat erst einmal die Hamas zum Vortrag geladen und dies alsa divine moment in a new state, and in, hopefully, a 6th caliphate,” bezeichnet, referring to the historical system of Islamic monarchies.

Aber keine Sorge, sie meinen damit natürlich ein ganz bürgerlich-liberales Kaliphat. Schließlich hat ja auch nur Hamadi Jebali vom 6. Kaliphat gesprochen, eine völlige Randfigur bei Ennadha, nämlich nur Kandidat für das Amt des nächsten Premierministers.

Keinen Monat nach den Wahlen hat Ennadha sich auch schon mal vom parlamentarischen System verabschiedet und verspricht sich nunmehr für ein starkes Präsidialsystem einzusetzen.

Und wie sie es mit den Frauenrechten halten? Dazu schreibt Hussein Ibish:

No sooner had the Islamist Al-Nahda party secured its status as the largest group in Tunisia’s new Constituent Assembly, than we saw a misogynist agenda rearing its ugly, familiar head. The party’s iconic spokeswoman, Souad Abderrahim, called single mothers a “disgrace” and declared that they “do not have the right to exist.” (…)

What’s important is that Abderrahim’s comments demonstrate where Al-Nahda, one of the least extreme among Arab Islamist parties, is coming from on the issue of women’s rights. Abderrahim, of course, had no comment about the role of men in creating single motherhood.

Siehe auch:

The Modernist Democratic Pole (PDM), made up of several political parties, associations and public figures, said that the recent statement of Hamadi Jebali, Secretary General of “Ennahdha” and its nominee to be the next prime minister, about the 6th caliphate, aroused doubts about his capacity to lead the government and about his party’s political plan.

16. November 2011, 10.24 Uhr:

Einfach abhauen

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Fast drei Viertel aller Jugendlichen in der arabischen Welt sehen für sich keine andere Perspektive, als ins Ausland zu gehen:

Around three quarters of Arab youth want to migrate to countries out of their region due to rising unemployment in Arab states, an Arab League official said.

“Due to their poor participation in society and politics and to rising joblessness, 70 per cent of the Arab youth want to migrate out of the region,” Khalid Al Wahishi, director of Population Policy and Immigration at Arab League, said.

15. November 2011, 16.16 Uhr:

Es herrscht Bürgerkrieg

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Der syrische Blogger Ammar Abdulhamid spricht es aus: in Syrien herrscht Bürgerkrieg.

There is no denying it anymore, and no sugarcoating it. It’s here, it’s now, it’s not going anywhere anytime soon – it’s Syria First Civil War of the modern era, and it is taking place everywhere: in Homs, in Hama, in Deir Ezzor, in Deraa and in Rural Damascus – and this is only the beginning.

Alleine gestern wurden 70 Menschen getötet, fast die Hälfte davon Regierungssoldaten.

14. November 2011, 20.03 Uhr:

Ägyptisches Handelsdefizit steigt weiter

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Für die ägyptische Wirtshaft sieht es weiter schwarz aus. Die jüngsten Zahlen:

The deficit in Egypt’s trade balance has grown by 22 per cent in August 2011 over August 2010 to reach LE18.1 billion ($3 billion), according to data from Egypt’s official statistics body, CAPMAS.

The significant annual increase in trade deficit is mainly attributed to the surge in imports, which rose by 16.2 per cent, heavily weighted by the increase in wheat and basic steel materials. This was partially offset by a 9 per cent increase of exports that reached LE13.3 billion.

On a monthly basis, the deficit grew by LE4.6 billion in August 2011 above July 2011, whereas exports dropped by LE2.6 billion and imports grew by LE2 billion.

The growth in trade deficit puts more downward pressure on the Egyptian pound, which has already been on the low since an uprising overthrew president Hosni Mubarak and led to an exodus of foreign investors and tourists.

13. November 2011, 15.34 Uhr:

Zehn Gründe, warum der Iran an der Bombe baut

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Zusammengestellt von Bruno Tertrais:

How do we know that Iran wants the Bomb? There is no single “smoking gun” (nor could there ever be one absent a nuclear test), but rather a multitude of “smoldering guns”. Most come from the work of the IAEA. Taken together, they lead to the inescapable conclusion that Iran wants at least a nuclear weapon option, and probably the Bomb.

1. Iran has sought to hide its activities and installations from the IAEA

In 2003, the magnitude of Iran’s efforts became public. Iran had concealed the construction of an enrichment plant at Natanz and of a research reactor at Arak, the fabrication of centrifuges, the existence of a laser enrichment program, and a number of sensitive experiments. [1] Iran then prevented the IAEA from a full inspection of the Lavisan-Shian and Parchin sites, suspected of hosting nuclear activities (which was indeed the case, as is now known). It later failed to declare in advance the construction of the Fordow enrichment plant.

2. Iran’s most sensitive activities are controlled by the Ministry of Defense

While Iran’s program is officially under the control of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), the IAEA has established that many hidden nuclear-related activities were in fact conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense. [2] In its latest report, the IAEA described in a very precise manner the “structured organization” that had been set up by Tehran to that effect. Until 2003, it was a true parallel program. Since 2003, these activities are more dispersed, probably to ensure more discretion. [3]

3. Iran’s enrichment program has no economic logic

Iran’s gas reserves would allow the country to be self-sufficient regarding electricity generation for several decades. Tehran’s investment in a costly enrichment program, allegedly to make fuel for nuclear power plants, has no economic rationale.

Natanz has limited capability: if completed, it could fuel only one reactor for a year. No country has ever operated an enrichment facility for just one plant – it is much cheaper, in such a case, to buy fuel on the market.

4. Iran’s enrichment program is inconsistent with its stated goals

Iran claims that it needs 3% enriched uranium for its nuclear power plants. But Russia provides the fuel for Bushehr – and it would be impossible for Iran to operate it with its own fuel. If the plan was to fuel a hypothetical future reactor, there is no reason why Tehran would have started enrichment as early as 2006.

Iran is now building a second enrichment plant at Fordow, but this buried installation is much smaller than Natanz. Its size is consistent with a military purpose.

In 2010, Iran has started to produce 20% enriched uranium, allegedly to re-fuel the Tehran research reactor. But there is no evidence that Iran has the know-how needed to make fuel rods for this particular reactor. And for technical reasons, 20% enrichment is very close to the 90% level which is deemed ideal for the manufacture of a nuclear weapon. In 2011, Iran announced its intention to transfer the production of 20% enriched uranium to Fordow, to “triple” such production, and to install in Fordow the latest centrifuge models. The Fordow installation would be ideal for quick production of 90% enriched uranium.

5. Iran possesses a document explaining how to cast uranium into hemispheres

The IAEA has determined that Iran possesses a document which explains how to cast uranium metal into hemispheres – that is, how to make a nuclear weapon core. [4] This document was given by the Khan network.

Den ganzen Artikel lesen

12. November 2011, 00.39 Uhr:

Westliche contra islamische Demokratie

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Abul Ala Maududi, Vordenker des islamischen Staates und Mitbegründer der Jama’at Islamiya, im Jahre 1948 über die Unterschiede zwischen dem Staatsmodell, das er “islamische Demokratie” nannte und westlichen Systemen:

What distinguishes Islamic democracy from Western democracy is that while the latter is based on the concept of popular sovereignty the former rests on the principle of popular Khilafat. In Western democracy the people are sovereign, in Islam sovereignty is vested in Allah and the people are His caliphs or representatives. In the former the people make their own laws; in the latter they have to follow and obey the laws (Shari‘ah) given by Allah through His Prophet. In one the Government undertakes to fulfil the will of the people; in the other Government and the people alike have to do the will of Allah. Western democracy is a kind of absolute authority which exercises its powers in a free and uncontrolled manner, whereas Islamic democracy is subservient to the Divine Law and exercises its authority in accordance with the injunctions of Allah and within the limits prescribed by Him.

Prägnanter lässt sich der Unterschied kaum formulieren. Wenn auch heute Islamisten davon sprechen, dass sie Demokraten seien, meinen sie mehr oder weniger dieses System der “islamischen Demokratie", in der es keine nationale Souveränität geben kann und die Legislative eigentlich nur eine beratende Funktion als Shura-Rat inne hat:

Legislation in an Islamic state should be within the limits prescribed by the Shari‘ah. The injunctions of Allah and His Prophet are to be accepted and obeyed and no legislative body can alter or modify them or make any new laws which are contrary to their spirit. The duty of ascertaining the real intent of those commandments which are open to more than one interpretation should devolve on people possessing a specialised knowledge of the law of Shari‘ah.

Man wird sehen, inwieweit die Muslimbrüder, die im Prinzip diese Definition des islamischen Staates teilen, in Zukunft bereit sein werden, Zugeständnisse zu machen. Denn eigentlich kann es, wie Gamal al-Banna, der Bruder von Hassan al Banna, dem Gründer der Muslimbrüder,  ganz richtig festellt, nur entweder einen islamischen oder einen “zivilen” Staat geben, denn:

There cannot be a civil state with an Islamic reference, and if this happens it will become a religious state, even if it is not like the Iranian model of a religious state, in which the clergy rule the country. If nothing else, the civilian and religious outlooks will differ and will therefore surrender to the religious outlook.

Und genau darin besteht momentan das Dilemma der islamistischen Parteien: Das Modell des “islamischen Staates” oder der “islamischen Demokratie” erscheint zumindest den Protagonisten des so genannten arabischen Frühlings wenig erstrebenswert und widerspricht den zentralen Forderungen der “arabischen Straße” nach Parlamentarismus, Verfassungsreform und Gewaltenteilung.  Kompromisse in so zentralen Fragen, wie der, wer denn Souverän sei und welche Bedeutung von Menschen gemachte Gesetze haben sollen, sind allerdings nur schwer zu finden. Je weiter sie aber von ihrer ursprünglichen Vorstellung abrücken, je mehr werden sie sich in diesen Widersprüchen verfangen.

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