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13. November 2011, 15.34 Uhr:

Zehn Gründe, warum der Iran an der Bombe baut

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Zusammengestellt von Bruno Tertrais:

How do we know that Iran wants the Bomb? There is no single “smoking gun” (nor could there ever be one absent a nuclear test), but rather a multitude of “smoldering guns”. Most come from the work of the IAEA. Taken together, they lead to the inescapable conclusion that Iran wants at least a nuclear weapon option, and probably the Bomb.

1. Iran has sought to hide its activities and installations from the IAEA

In 2003, the magnitude of Iran’s efforts became public. Iran had concealed the construction of an enrichment plant at Natanz and of a research reactor at Arak, the fabrication of centrifuges, the existence of a laser enrichment program, and a number of sensitive experiments. [1] Iran then prevented the IAEA from a full inspection of the Lavisan-Shian and Parchin sites, suspected of hosting nuclear activities (which was indeed the case, as is now known). It later failed to declare in advance the construction of the Fordow enrichment plant.

2. Iran’s most sensitive activities are controlled by the Ministry of Defense

While Iran’s program is officially under the control of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), the IAEA has established that many hidden nuclear-related activities were in fact conducted under the auspices of the Ministry of Defense. [2] In its latest report, the IAEA described in a very precise manner the “structured organization” that had been set up by Tehran to that effect. Until 2003, it was a true parallel program. Since 2003, these activities are more dispersed, probably to ensure more discretion. [3]

3. Iran’s enrichment program has no economic logic

Iran’s gas reserves would allow the country to be self-sufficient regarding electricity generation for several decades. Tehran’s investment in a costly enrichment program, allegedly to make fuel for nuclear power plants, has no economic rationale.

Natanz has limited capability: if completed, it could fuel only one reactor for a year. No country has ever operated an enrichment facility for just one plant – it is much cheaper, in such a case, to buy fuel on the market.

4. Iran’s enrichment program is inconsistent with its stated goals

Iran claims that it needs 3% enriched uranium for its nuclear power plants. But Russia provides the fuel for Bushehr – and it would be impossible for Iran to operate it with its own fuel. If the plan was to fuel a hypothetical future reactor, there is no reason why Tehran would have started enrichment as early as 2006.

Iran is now building a second enrichment plant at Fordow, but this buried installation is much smaller than Natanz. Its size is consistent with a military purpose.

In 2010, Iran has started to produce 20% enriched uranium, allegedly to re-fuel the Tehran research reactor. But there is no evidence that Iran has the know-how needed to make fuel rods for this particular reactor. And for technical reasons, 20% enrichment is very close to the 90% level which is deemed ideal for the manufacture of a nuclear weapon. In 2011, Iran announced its intention to transfer the production of 20% enriched uranium to Fordow, to “triple” such production, and to install in Fordow the latest centrifuge models. The Fordow installation would be ideal for quick production of 90% enriched uranium.

5. Iran possesses a document explaining how to cast uranium into hemispheres

The IAEA has determined that Iran possesses a document which explains how to cast uranium metal into hemispheres – that is, how to make a nuclear weapon core. [4] This document was given by the Khan network.

Den ganzen Artikel lesen

12. November 2011, 00.39 Uhr:

Westliche contra islamische Demokratie

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Abul Ala Maududi, Vordenker des islamischen Staates und Mitbegründer der Jama’at Islamiya, im Jahre 1948 über die Unterschiede zwischen dem Staatsmodell, das er “islamische Demokratie” nannte und westlichen Systemen:

What distinguishes Islamic democracy from Western democracy is that while the latter is based on the concept of popular sovereignty the former rests on the principle of popular Khilafat. In Western democracy the people are sovereign, in Islam sovereignty is vested in Allah and the people are His caliphs or representatives. In the former the people make their own laws; in the latter they have to follow and obey the laws (Shari‘ah) given by Allah through His Prophet. In one the Government undertakes to fulfil the will of the people; in the other Government and the people alike have to do the will of Allah. Western democracy is a kind of absolute authority which exercises its powers in a free and uncontrolled manner, whereas Islamic democracy is subservient to the Divine Law and exercises its authority in accordance with the injunctions of Allah and within the limits prescribed by Him.

Prägnanter lässt sich der Unterschied kaum formulieren. Wenn auch heute Islamisten davon sprechen, dass sie Demokraten seien, meinen sie mehr oder weniger dieses System der “islamischen Demokratie", in der es keine nationale Souveränität geben kann und die Legislative eigentlich nur eine beratende Funktion als Shura-Rat inne hat:

Legislation in an Islamic state should be within the limits prescribed by the Shari‘ah. The injunctions of Allah and His Prophet are to be accepted and obeyed and no legislative body can alter or modify them or make any new laws which are contrary to their spirit. The duty of ascertaining the real intent of those commandments which are open to more than one interpretation should devolve on people possessing a specialised knowledge of the law of Shari‘ah.

Man wird sehen, inwieweit die Muslimbrüder, die im Prinzip diese Definition des islamischen Staates teilen, in Zukunft bereit sein werden, Zugeständnisse zu machen. Denn eigentlich kann es, wie Gamal al-Banna, der Bruder von Hassan al Banna, dem Gründer der Muslimbrüder,  ganz richtig festellt, nur entweder einen islamischen oder einen “zivilen” Staat geben, denn:

There cannot be a civil state with an Islamic reference, and if this happens it will become a religious state, even if it is not like the Iranian model of a religious state, in which the clergy rule the country. If nothing else, the civilian and religious outlooks will differ and will therefore surrender to the religious outlook.

Und genau darin besteht momentan das Dilemma der islamistischen Parteien: Das Modell des “islamischen Staates” oder der “islamischen Demokratie” erscheint zumindest den Protagonisten des so genannten arabischen Frühlings wenig erstrebenswert und widerspricht den zentralen Forderungen der “arabischen Straße” nach Parlamentarismus, Verfassungsreform und Gewaltenteilung.  Kompromisse in so zentralen Fragen, wie der, wer denn Souverän sei und welche Bedeutung von Menschen gemachte Gesetze haben sollen, sind allerdings nur schwer zu finden. Je weiter sie aber von ihrer ursprünglichen Vorstellung abrücken, je mehr werden sie sich in diesen Widersprüchen verfangen.

11. November 2011, 21.46 Uhr:

UNhumor

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Aus der Haaretz:

Israel’s ambassador to UNESCO was handed an official letter of protest from the organization’s director general, Irina Bokova, on Wednesday regarding a cartoon published in Ha’aretz on Nov. 4 after UNESCO decided to accept Palestine as a full member.

The cartoon showed Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak sending an air force squadron to attack Iran, with Netanyahu ordering, “And on your way back, you’re gonna hit the UNESCO office in Ramallah!” Ambassador Nimrod Barkan pointed out that the government has no control over editorial cartoons printed in the papers. “Ask yourselves what you did to make a moderate paper with a deeply internationalist bent publish such a cartoon,” he suggested. “Perhaps the problem is with you.”

11. November 2011, 01.30 Uhr:

Kein Asyl für schwulen Saudi Diplomaten

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Wenn’s um die guten Beziehungen zu den Saudis geht, muss man schon mal Kompromisse eingehen, d. h. das Asylrecht ein wenig flexibel auslegen:

ALI Ahmed Asseri, the gay former Saudi diplomat in Los Angeles, has had his political asylum application denied by the Obama administration because of apparent fears that giving refuge to him might upset relations with the kingdom, according to Ali al-Ahmed, a Saudi dissident in Washington, D.C.

“This was a political decision by the Obama administration, who are afraid of upsetting the Saudis,” said Ahmed in a phone interview. “His initial interview with Homeland Security was very positive, but then they came back and grilled him for two days after they found out that he had worked in the public prosecutor’s office in Saudi Arabia. He had been an inspector to make sure that judicial punishments, such as lashings, were carried out within the law—not more, not less. They then accused him of participating in a form of torture,” explained Ahmed.

Seine Aufgabe war es, darauf zu achten, dass Auspeitschungen auch gesetzekonform ausgeführt wurden. So ist es eben, wenn man Inspektor im Königreich der Sauds, dem guten engen Verbündeten am Golf ist, dem Land, das auch deutsche Politiker so gerne als moderat bezeichnen.

10. November 2011, 12.34 Uhr:

Die Schuld der Reformer

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Hart geht dankenswerterweise Mahmood Delkhasteh mit den so genannten Reformern im Iran zu Gericht, die seiner Ansicht nach einen Großteil der Schuld am Scheitern der Massenproteste gegen das Regime im Jahre 2009 tragen:

The common view is that mass arrests, violent repression, and a telecommunications blackout shut down the peaceful Green Movement in 2009, when protesters took to the streets over rigged presidential elections. But Iran’s own “reformers” deserve much of the blame. And they still stand in the way of change. (…)

To be sure, the security crackdown on protesters in 2009 discouraged participation in the Green Movement. But much more discouraging, I believe, was the cautious message of reformers once the chant of protesters changed from “Where is my vote?” to “Death to Khamenei” (Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) and “Independence, Freedom, Iranian Republic.”

The new slogans arose after the supreme leader gave an ultimatum to protesters to go back home or face a violent crackdown. But reformers, too, rebuked the demonstrators’ rhetorical switch, which amounted to a call for regime change. (…)

Iranians are paying a high price for allowing reformers to play politics with their future. Real change cannot take place within this repressive, regressive structure in which autocratic clerics constitutionally have the last word. Intransigence is again visible as the supreme leader threatens to eliminate the post of president.

Ganz sicher trifft diese Kritik auch auf jene 120 “iranische Intellektuellen” zu, die jetzt einen “offenen Brief” veröffentlich haben, in dem sie vor einem Angriff auf den Iran warnen:

We the signatories of this [public] letter, a group of human rights defenders and [political and social] freedom activists, want peaceful transition to democracy and a government in Iran that emanate from free elections to secure the civil, political, social, cultural, and economical rights of all Iranians. We hope that there will soon be a political system in Iran in which all the Iranian people, men and women, from any ethnicity, language, religion and belief can participate in its running on equal basis and have effective presence in it, a political system that does not discriminate against half the population of the country – the women – and deny them their fundamental rights. We believe that the only way of achieving this goal is through stressing the national sovereignty, protecting Iran’s territorial integrity, and recovery of all the rights of the people.

Denn während der Iran weiter an der Bombe baut, bleibt die große Frage, die sie Jahr für Jahr unbeantwortet lassen: Wie bitte soll denn der “friedliche, demokratische Wandel” aussehen und wie wollen sie ihn erreichen?

9. November 2011, 12.11 Uhr:

Ein Handabhacker

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Erinnert sich noch wer an Samir Kuntar? Wie er als Held in Beirut, Damaskus und Teheran ermpfangen wurde?

Als er bei einem Gefangeneaustausch 2008 aus israelischer Haft entlassen wurde, schrieb die Süddeutsche:

Für die Libanesen hingegen ist er der am längsten in Israel einsitzende Gefangene und ein Volksheld.

Nicht für Hanin Ghaddar, die in einem Beitrag für Now Lebanon Kuntar aber sowas von in die Tonne tritt, dass die Lektüre ein einziges Vergnügen ist.  Auch wenn die Autoren von Now Lebanon, alles vehemente Unterstützer der Zederrevolution, nicht sonderlich repräsentativ für “die Libenaesen” sind, zeigt der Text doch, dass einige alte Narrative in der Region seit Beginn der Aufstände in Syrien nicht mehr wirklich funktionieren wollen:

Kuntar told the Syrian people that he is ready to cut off the hands of any Syrian who dares challenge the Assad regime. (…)

The problem is that people like Kuntar do not understand that Assad is just buying time, and that he and his regime are too weak to refuse any initiative. They still look at the Syrian regime as a sacred entity because it supports the scared Resistance. Kuntar is the Syrian regime’s kind of hero, one that cuts hands and protects murderers.

After he was released, he rushed to Syria to get his medal, but did not mention the Lebanese who have been rotting in Syrian jails for decades or the Syrian political prisoners who have suffered much worse conditions than those he faced in Israeli prison.  For they are not heroes. They did not kill any Israelis. All other political activity is a conspiracy, and deserves death, torture and pain. All those calling for freedom in the Syrian streets do not make sense to people like Kuntar. All the Syrian children who died in the past eight months are just victims of a conspiracy and deserve no sympathy. All prisoners who are viciously tortured every day by the Syrian security forces are not human beings.

It is the same arrogance that divides people into the honorable ones who support the Resistance and the traitors who are against it. If you are not ready to sacrifice your freedom, dignity and future for the sake of the Resistance and your dictator, you do not deserve to live.

8. November 2011, 19.15 Uhr:

Was eigentlich ist ein islamischer Staat?

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Eine interessante (wenn auch schon etwas ältere) Zusammenfassung der Debatten innerhalb islamistischer Parteien, was eigentlich ein islamischer Staat, bzw. eine islamische Demokratie sein soll, bzw. sein kann, die die Bruchlinien innerhalb der Bewegung zeigt:

Few question the coming electoral success of religious activists, but as they emerge from the shadows of a long, sometimes bloody struggle with authoritarian and ostensibly secular governments, they are confronting newly urgent questions about how to apply Islamic precepts to more open societies with very concrete needs.

In Turkey and Tunisia, culturally conservative parties founded on Islamic principles are rejecting the name “Islamist” to stake out what they see as a more democratic and tolerant vision.

In Egypt, a similar impulse has begun to fracture the Muslim Brotherhood as a growing number of politicians and parties argue for a model inspired by Turkey, where a party with roots in political Islam has thrived in a once-adamantly secular system. Some contend that the absolute monarchy of puritanical Saudi Arabia in fact violates Islamic law.

A backlash has ensued, as well, as traditionalists have flirted with timeworn Islamist ideas like imposing interest-free banking and obligatory religious taxes and censoring irreligious discourse.

The debates are deep enough that many in the region believe that the most important struggles may no longer occur between Islamists and secularists, but rather among the Islamists themselves, pitting the more puritanical against the more liberal.

Siehe dazu auch meinen etwas älteren Beitrag: Entweder Scharia oder “man made laws”

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