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Kürzliche Beiträge
16. April 2012, 00.32 Uhr:

Verrat an der iranischen Demokratiebewegung

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Patrick Clawson meint in Foreign Policy völlig zu Recht, dass der so geannte Westen jederzeit bereit ist, die iranische Demokratie- und Menschenrechtsbewegung für einen Atomdeal mit dem Regime zu opfern:

One reason Iranian democrats worry that we would throw them under a bus for a nuclear deal is because that is exactly what we would do. The cold truth is that the West, including the United States, would gladly negotiate a nuclear agreement with Iran’s hardliners at the expense of Iranian human rights and democracy. If all it took to reach a nuclear deal were to remain silent about Tehran’s repression, the prospects for a deal would be excellent. But in fact what holds up the deal is that Iran is not prepared to give up much of its nuclear program and the West is not convinced that the Islamic Republic would live up to any commitment it makes. What’s more, the West – especially the United States – is not willing to offer much in trade so long as the fundamental geostrategic conflict with Iran remains.

14. April 2012, 23.27 Uhr:

Afghanistan: Die Katastrophe

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Lieutenant-Colonel Daniel Davis ist der Überzeugung, dass in Afghanistan alles noch viel schlimmer ist, als berichtet wird. Er reiste durchs Land, interviewte unzählige Afghanen und US-Soldaten und hat nun Berichte vorgelegt, über den der Guardian folgendes schreibt:

As part of his job he had criss-crossed the country, travelling 9,000 miles and talking to more than 250 people. He had built up a picture of a hopeless cause; a country where Afghan soldiers were incapable of holding on to American gains. US soldiers would fight and die for territory and then see Afghan troops let it fall to the Taliban. Often the Afghans actively worked with the Taliban or simply refused to fight. One Afghan police officer laughed in Davis’s face when asked if he ever tried to fight the enemy. “That would be dangerous!” the man said.

Yet at the same time Davis saw America’s military chiefs, such as General David Petraeus, constantly speak about America’s successes, especially when working with local troops. So Davis compiled two reports: one classified and one unclassified. He sent both to politicians in Washington and lobbied them on his concerns. Then in February he went public by giving an interview to the New York Times and writing a damning editorial in a military newspaper. Then – and only then – did he tell his own army bosses what he had done.


13. April 2012, 22.03 Uhr:

»Lächerliche Debatten über Genitalverstümmelung, Niqab und Sharia ...«

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Der angesehene tunesische Rechtswissenschaftler  Yadh ben Achour in deutlichen Worten über die, von den Islamisten angestoßenen, politischen Debatten in seinem Land:

Everything we’ve done so far has been a waste of valuable time in lamentable and ridiculous discussions about female circumcision, the niqab, Sharia, the caliphate, and other dreams and utopias which all proceed from thoughts which will never be realized. It was these very thoughts that were once the fundamental causes of the general decline of the Muslim world. Turkey, ruled by an Islamic-oriented party, is admired not because it applies Sharia, or agrees with Salafism, or is inspired by the somber niqab for its fashion. The reasons for its success comes from the fact that they lead a secular state, which has achieved an economic growth rate well above 7% and is led by a competent government.

13. April 2012, 21.42 Uhr:

Warum wählen ägyptische Dorfbewohner die Islamisten?

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Ein aufschlussreicher Artikel über das Wahlverhalten in einem ägyptischen Dorf, dessen Bewohner merheitlich islamistisch gewählt haben. Die Autorin versucht auch den überraschenden Wahlerfolg der Salafiten zu erklären:

Despite the common perception that Salafis are strict followers of Sharia compared to the Muslim Brotherhood, many of my research participants often talked about Salafis as religiously less strict than the Ikhwan. From the work of Ikwani leaders in the village, the villagers have noticed the strict hierarchy that informs the work of the Brotherhood members on the ground. In other words, the villagers understood the Brotherhood’s adherence to the dictates of the Guidance Bureau, or the Murshid, as an orthodoxy that made the Brotherhood stricter than the Salafis. They often said to me: “How come Ikhwan grassroot leaders all agree on the same things?” An incident that they often referred to is the insistence of Muslim Brotherhood members to force people to pray outside of a mosque, not build by the Brotherhood, during the Eid al-Fitr prayer last September.

Salafis, on the other hand, are seen as religiously flexible. “Aren’t we all Salafis?” many Nour supporters often repeated to me. For them, Salafis represent a religious understanding that seeks to closely follow the times of the Prophet and his followers — the Prophet was married to a Coptic woman, his neighbors were Jews, he dealt with each situation on a case-by-case basis, hence the perception that Salafis are, believe it or not, lenient. This was reflected on the ground; Salafis, at least in the village where I worked, appear to be more laid-back compared to the Ikhwan, and hence, more sensitive and open to the local context. (…)


13. April 2012, 01.02 Uhr:

Ägypten, ein Jahr nach dem Sturz Mubaraks

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Itzhak Levanon bis Ende vergangenen Jahres der israelische Botschafter in Ägypten in einem sehr lesenswerten Essay über die Lage im Land ein jahr nach dem Sturz Mubaraks, die Zukunft des Friedensabkommens und die Taktik der Muslimbrüder.

Seine Einschätzung in Stichpunkten:

During the first year of the revolution the army took over from the president, but it had always been kept away from politics by Mubarak, so when power was transferred to them, they had no experience in domestic politics and they started to make mistakes. In all my meetings with President Mubarak, together with Israeli, American, and Palestinian personalities, Field Marshal Tantawi, the minister of defense, was never present.

Few in Egypt believe that the army is sincere about the transfer of power to the civilians. Many believe that the real objective of the army is to maintain its special status, which the army has had in Egypt since the revolution of 1952. They have their own hospitals and hotels. They are deeply involved in the economy, and they have their own budget. This is an institution that is quasi-independent, and very strong.

After years of imposed political exile, the Muslim Brotherhood has entered domestic political life in Egypt by the front door. At an early stage after the revolution, we detected at least a tacit understanding between the military and the Muslim Brotherhood, to the detriment of the revolutionaries.

My assessment is that the Muslim Brotherhood will compromise with others and will seek a consensus. They understand that if there is failure, the failure will be theirs. This is why they would like to share it with others, and this basically means pluralism. This does not mean that they will not work very hard in order to reach their objective, which is to capture the public, not to change the regime. If they can spread their ideology to enough people, the change will come from them.

For at least 30 years, Mubarak’s regime intentionally reduced the volume of bilateral relations between Israel and Egypt, keeping a high-level contact channel only with the presidency and his close entourage. I believe there should have been reciprocity. Israeli ambassadors did not have free access to ministries, to parties, were banned by the media, were banned by all the unions, while in Israel the Egyptian ambassador is invited to meet with the top level, including the prime minister, and the media quotes him.

There are still security contacts at the upper levels between Israel and Egypt, and this is because there is an interest on both sides, but there are no bilateral relations. The public in Egypt is not aware enough that the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt is an Egyptian interest, no less than an Israeli one. It would be wise at this early stage to explain to the Egyptian public that the alternative to peace is a nightmare that we should all avoid.

11. April 2012, 23.48 Uhr:

Und immer wieder Siemens

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

2009 im Iran. Erinnert sich noch wer? Da half Siemens auch an vorderster Front mit.

Das brutale Vorgehen iranischer Bassidsch-Milizen gegen Demonstranten sorgte (…) auch in Deutschland für mediales Aufsehen. Die staatlichen Spezialeinheiten knüppelten jede spontane Versammlung nieder, um größere Menschenansammlungen zu verhindern. Geholfen hatte wohl Soft- und Hardware von Nokia Siemens Networks (NSN), einem Joint Venture der deutschen Siemens AG mit dem finnischen Nokia-Konzern.

Und nun in Syrien:

Wie das ARD-Magazin “Fakt” berichtet, hat Siemens im Jahr 2000 Netzwerk-Überwachungstechnik an das Regime in Syrien geliefert. Die syrische Mobilfunkgesellschaft Syriatel hat demnach sogenannte “Monitoring Center” erhalten. Das Unternehmen Nokia Siemens Networks bestätigte laut “Fakt” die Lieferung.

Aber auch in Bahrain:

Iran is one of many authoritarian countries across the Mideast and North Africa employing Western surveillance tools for political repression. In Bahrain, for instance, communications monitoring centers sold by Siemens AG (SIE), and maintained by Espoo, Finland-based Nokia Siemens Networks and then its divested unit, Trovicor GmbH, have been used to track and arrest activists, according to a Bloomberg News investigation.

11. April 2012, 22.37 Uhr:

Klage gegen verfassungsgebende Versammlung

von Thomas von der Osten-Sacken

Noch bevor sie mit ihrer Arbeit begonnen hat, ist die Verfassungsgebende Versammlung in Ägypten in der nächsten Krise. Weil Muslimbrüder und Salafiten versucht hatten, sie völlig zu dominieren, riefen Vertreter der so genannten liberalen und nichtreligiösen Parteien, aber auch der Kopten und selbst die Al Azhar Universität zum Boykott der Versammlung auf und bleiben den Sitzungen fern.  Nun hatte auch eine Klage Erfolg:

The Supreme Administrative Court blocked Egypt’s constituent assembly Tuesday after ruling in favour of a recent lawsuit questioning the constitutionality of the formation of the 100-member constituent assembly. The case was referred to the Commissioner’s Office at State Council, which would then have the authority to move the lawsuit to Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court (SCC).

A number of prominent lawyers filed the lawsuit against the parliament including Gad Nasser, professor of constitutional law at Cairo University, Mohamed Shehata, head of the Arab Centre for Transparency and Integrity, Sameh Ashour, the head of the Lawyers’ Syndicate and presidential hopeful Khaled Ali.

Und wenn man schon in Ägypten ist unbedingt lesenswert ist dieser Artikel über das Weltbild des Päsidentschaftskandiadten der Muslimbrüder: ‘Every aspect of life is to be Islamicized’

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